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Introduction 
 
For a long time after the splitting in 1949, both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) were undemocratic regimes. Both were ideologically based on the mixing of the ideas 
of Leninism and nationalism. In current times, China is still a non-democratic regime, 
whereas Taiwan is considered a (flawed) democracy. Unfortunately, simple comparisons 
between China and Taiwan could be easily challenged by some factors, inter alia by the size 
of both countries and number of inhabitants. As John Fairbank (1998) has written: 
“Comparisons of Taiwan and the mainland are vitiated by the factor of size. The burden of 
governing 1200 million people scattered over a subcontinent is greater than that of governing 
25 million people on a not-very-big island.” On the other hand, there are also factors more 
favorable for the comparison, i.e. shared history and very similar cultural prerequisites or 
similar mentality of the Chinese and Taiwanese people. Another factor, that was used two 
decades ago by John Fairbank as an obstacle for the comparison – the absence of huge 
foreign investments in PRC in comparison with Taiwan – has been eliminated. For these 
reasons I assume, that the comparison between PRC and Taiwan is now possible and 
beneficial. Moreover, comparability does not mean similarity, as Bruce Gilley pointed out 
(Gilley 2008: 5). 
 
The goal of this paper is to compare both countries within three general sets of indicators: 
economic development (especially in GDP per capita), support for the democratic values 
among the population and level of the political participation. This comparison will be made 
not only between China and Taiwan overall, but where the data will be available, I will 
include examples from Chinese provinces, for the sake of avoiding the problematic “factor 
of size”. In other words, I will strive to answer whether we can find similar indicators, which 
have a key impact on democratization (such as economic development), or patterns in the 
perception of democracy and political participation, and if yes, how far they could be 
considered as an example for China´s political transition. 
 
In the first part of the text, I will focus on the brief introduction of some important 
theoretical issues. In the main part of the text, the quantitative evidence will be presented and 
compared for highlighting similarities and differences between the two countries in the areas 
closely connected with democratization process. I will substitute a classic conclusion for 
some summarizing thoughts about the possible future development of Chinese political 
regime.  
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Theoretical and methodological 
framework: regimes, preconditions and 
modernization 
 
As mentioned above, both Taiwan and PRC were ruled by undemocratic regimes for a long 
time and both have undergone significant qualitative changes. Nowadays, Taiwan is, 
according to the Democracy Index, a “flawed democracy” (EIU 2011: 3-8). The former non-
democratic one-party system, ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT) was changed through the 
“engineered transition” to the two-party democratic system. As Yun-han Chu (2012: 51) 
pointed out, “Taiwan was perhaps the only case among the third wave democracies in which 
a quasi-Leninist party not only survived an authoritarian breakdown but turned the crisis to 
its advantage“. This quote is quite important, because it shows that the transition from a one-
party ruled system is not necessary the “end station” for the ruling party. In the case of the 
current PRC´s regime, its classification is much more difficult. The regime was clearly 
transformed from the pure totalitarian to the authoritarian regime during the era of 
"opening", introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the late seventies. However, the regime was later 
challenged by significant changes in society, mainly caused by the quick economic growth. 
Because of this, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was forced to adopt necessary 
measures. But not just the internal affairs have shaped the specificity of Chinese regime. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union as well as communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe 
pose a big experience and memento for the CCP leaders. These are the reasons why it is so 
difficult to precisely define the contemporary regime in China – it has been adapted several 
times. Therefore, different authors are trying to capture the real essence of regime with 
modified theories of authoritarianism. 
 
The concept of “fragmented authoritarianism” was introduced by Kenneth G. Lieberthal 
already in 1988. Another specific approach, closely connected with democratization is the 
theory of “resilient authoritarianism” promoted by American scholar Andrew J. Nathan. 
Nathan argues that China was “an autocratic system responsive enough to societal demands 
to keep itself in power for a long time” (Heberer 2010). There are also other theories, like the 
“popular authoritarianism” (Brady 2009) or “deliberative authoritarianism” (Baogang a 
Thøgersen 2010).  
 
Within this theoretical chapter, it is really important to also say a few words about some key 
values as well as the Chinese perception of the term of “democracy”. First of all, the cultural 
preconditions are frequently considered as a key feature in Chinese democratization and they 
are always commemorated, when it comes to the question of the Taiwanese example. 
Especially Confucianism was often considered as an obstacle for the spread of democracy, 
although some authors argue that modernization processes will cause serious shifts in the 
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Confucian values (Chang – Chu 2002: 28). Taiwan is always mentioned as a primary 
example of the Chinese nation that is apparently and strongly influenced by the Confucian 
values, but still was able to develop a democratic regime.  Due to the constant economic 
growth combined with Asian nationalism, the non-democratic regime in China is able to 
challenge the Western values and question the validity of Western notion of democracy and 
human rights in the Asian area. Chinese perception of democracy2 differs significantly from 
the Western liberal-democratic tradition. For example Shaun Breslin argues, that in China, 
“democratization is an essential component of the national project and preventing liberalism 
– even worse, foreign liberalism – from harming the Chinese people and undermining 
Chinese power” (Breslin 2010: 146).  
 
Last but not least, it is substantive to elaborate on the validity of the modernization theory. 
Despite the fact that its thesis, that modernization favors democratization has been 
challenged repeatedly, nowadays this is fact beyond serious doubt (Welzel 2009: 81). It is 
also without doubt, that modernization theory is used very frequently in the Chinese 
conditions, primarily due to the rapid growth of PRC´s economy. Economy itself has a big 
influence on the perception of the regime by the people in PRC, because they tend to judge 
the quality of the regime according to their own economic situation and wealth 
(jdsurvey.com 2009).  
 
As for the methodology, one short note about the relevance of data used below is necessary.  
For some comparisons, data from the Asian Barometer Survey are used as the evidence in 
the next chapter. Since some scholars are questioning reliability of this survey on the 
mainland China, I have to justify my intention to use its outputs. First of all, no more 
relevant data exists. To avoid misunderstandings in the interpretation of the most important 
concepts, such as democracy, different kinds of questions are used. After all, the explanatory 
power of this survey for single country is not so weak, as some scholars suggest. For 
example, when we look on the results of Asian Barometer Survey questions regarding to the 
legitimacy of the regime, the support of the Chinese regime will be for most Westerners 
surprisingly high. On the other hand, if we compare these findings with some Western 
researches about Chinese regime legitimacy (Gilley 2006), the results will be strikingly 
similar. Why is that? The key lies in the contextualization. The results of both approaches are 
most likely valid only for the highest levels of the Chinese regime – e.g. central government, 
but not for regime as a whole. The lower we go in the regime structure, the lower the 
legitimacy of particular governmental level. From this example we need to understand, that 
the results of the Asian Barometer Survey must be interpreted in the context of the each 
given situation.  
 
                                                 
2
 The Chinese notion of the term “democracy” could be defined as “a broader influence of population 
on the politics and internal affairs” (Womack 1984: 417).  
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The Evidence 
 
To ensure sufficiently meaningful evidence, the comparison will be conducted in three 
separate parts. The first will focus on the economic indicators, the second on the public view 
of different issues connected with the type of regime or political participation, and the third 
will bring results of some indexes, connected with measuring democracy and some of its 
sectional indicators.  
 
1. Economic indicators 
 
In the modernization theory, the GDP per capita is always the most important variable, 
according to the predictions are made. Figure 1 indicates, that the income level in Taiwan 
and the mainland, with imposing 26 year long lag, shows very similar development in both 
countries. On the contrary, if we look on the Figure 2, which shows GDP per capita during 
the 1970 – 2011 period, it is obvious, that the difference between Taiwan and PRC is still 
huge, despite the fact that the Chinese numbers have been rising steadily in the last decade.  
  
Figure 1: Income Levels in Taiwan (1951–1986) and China (1977–2004) (Source: Gilley 
2008: 6) 
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Figure 2: GDP per capita, current prices in US$, 1970 – 2011 (Source: econstats.com 
2013a,b), Data are similar to the World Bank data.  
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Even if we take into consideration these predictions that reach into the year 2017, as shows 
the Figure 3, we must admit that these numbers are proving a big gap between Taiwan and 
PRC. When we look back into history, in the year of Taiwanese transition, the GDP per 
capita had a value of 13,376 in the current US Dollars. For the comparison, predicted value 
of mainland´s GDP per capita in 2017 is 9,152 US Dollars, therefore significantly below the 
“necessary” value, which will be probably not reached until around 2025. This fact leads 
some scholars to predict that China will be a democratic country sometime around the 
mentioned year3. On the other hand, it should be noted that China´s GDP per capita is low, 
because of its large population. If we take into account the three richest municipalities in 
China – Tianjin, Beijing and Shanghai, the GDP per capita numbers are suddenly quite 
different. Tianjin (13 058) has almost surpassed the Taiwanese 1996 score, and the two other 
cities are also very close.  Other rich provinces are right now around the value that is 
predicted for the whole China for the year 2017.  
 
A brief look on the Human development index (Table 1) also shows, that the mainland is 
quite behind Taiwan. Once more, the huge population as well as the unequal distribution of 
wealth are responsible for this large gap.  For example Beijing is again nearly on the same 
level as Taiwan.  
 
                                                 
3
 For example Henry Rowen has predicted in 2007, that China will be „partly free“ country in 2025 
(Rowen 2007). 
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Figure 3: GDP per capita forecast, current prices in US$, 2007 – 2017 (Source: 
econstats.com 2013a,b), Data are similar to the World Bank data.  
 
Table 1: HDI Index4 
 
 Taiwan PRC Beijing 
HDI 2010 0,868 0,682 N/A 
HDI 2011 0,882 0,687 0,834 
 
2. Support for democratic values 
 
The following observations are based mainly on the Asian Barometer data, collected 
between years 2005 and 2008.  From a simple assumption that Taiwan already has a 
democratic regime and moreover is economically more developed, we could assume that 
support for democracy will be higher than in PRC.5 Let’s start with the question “Which 
would you think democracy is suitable for your country?” Results in Figure 4 show, that 
almost every respondent in mainland thinks that democracy is quite or perfectly suitable for 
                                                 
4
 UN does not count HDI for Taiwan and on the contrary its numbers are included to the PRC results. 
Numbers of Taiwan are counted by the Taiwanese government itself.  
5
 This correlation is not universally valid, and could be reversed as some disruptive factors as 
economic saturation or inability of democratic regime to solve important problems can come in effect. 
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his country. On the contrary, in Taiwan there is a surprisingly significant group of people, 
which does not consider democracy as a suitable political system for their country.  
 
Figure 4: Which would you think democracy is suitable for your country? (1 = completly 
unsuitable, 10 = perfectly suitable) Source: Asian Barometer 
 
 
To avoid potential misunderstandings in different perception of democracy, another question 
is focused on the contradistinction between democratic and authoritarian regime (see table 
2). Once again, Chinese respondents have showed bigger support for democracy, when 80 
percent of them said, that democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government, 
while 22 percent of Taiwanese respondents were open to the authoritarian form of regime.  
 
Table 2: Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? 
 
 Taiwan PRC 
For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a 
democratic or a nondemocratic regime 
26,90% 12,00% 
Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government 
can be preferable to a democratic one 
22,00% 8,00% 
Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of 
government 
50,90% 80,00% 
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If we look on the changes through the time, it is clear, that the support of democracy in PRC 
was approximately on the same level in 2002 and 2008, whereas support for democracy in 
Taiwan slightly strengthened (jdsurvey.net 2009). Even older surveys are confirming this 
development. As Andrew Nathan noted, “traditional values weakened and democratic values 
strengthened from the first set of surveys in 1993 to the second set of surveys in 2002. And 
across social categories, urban, younger, and better-educated people (those more exposed to 
the forces of modernization) are less traditional-minded and, in general, more 
democratically-inclined than those in the countryside and those who are older or have less 
education” (Nathan 2008: 180). 
 
Another two questions, which results are shown in tables 3 and 4 are focused on the level 
and satisfaction with democracy in both countries. According to these results, 78,5 percent of 
respondents on the mainland think that PRC is a full democracy or democracy with only 
minor problems. Taiwanese citizens are much more critical. The same situation is in the case 
of satisfaction, where nearly 90 percent of mainland respondents are satisfied with the way 
democracy works in PRC. From the Western point of view quite unbelievable result. These 
numbers have to be approached with strong critical view, but despite this warning, it´s clear, 
that perception of democracy in both countries is strongly positive.6  
 
Table 3: In your opinion how much of a democracy is Taiwan/PRC?  
 Taiwan PRC 
A full democracy  5,90% 26,70% 
A democracy, but with minor 
problems  
47,00% 51,80% 
A democracy, with major problems  39,50% 19,80% 
Not a democracy  7,50% 1,50% 
 
Table 4: On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works 
in Taiwan/PRC? 
 
 Taiwan PRC 
Not at all satisfied  5,60% 1,20% 
Not very satisfied  35,50% 10,10% 
Fairly satisfied  54,60% 71,60% 
Very satisfied  4,20% 17,00% 
 
                                                 
6
 Once more I have to point out, that democracy in Chinese perception does not equal multiparty 
western-style liberal democracy, especially because of different ideological base.  
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Overall, results about the support of democratic values are quite puzzling and have to be 
interpreted by additional explanation.  
 
Thin distinctions between understanding of key terms can be surely responsible for some of 
the variations, but different experiences of both countries are more important. Experience 
with some common democratic deficits in Taiwan may lead to the lower support of 
democracy and on the other hand, not enough experience with real (liberal) democracy may 
lead many Chinese respondents to the assumption that their regime is quite good democracy 
(of course in the Chinese perception of this term). This could be also connected with 
indoctrination by the Chinese state propaganda about doctrines like Chinese “democratic 
socialism” (Lee 2013). After all, “democracy” is surely a common word in the CCP´s 
rhetoric and as long as the regime is doing well in socio-economic sphere, people has no 
reason to question party´s claims about democratic China.  
 
From this point of view, actual answers on question about characteristics essential to 
democracy could be more important. We can use question nr. 92 which is: “If you have to 
choose only one of the things that I am going to read, which one would you choose as the 
most essential to a democracy?” Possible valid answers were: 
 
 Opportunity to change the government through elections  
 Freedom to criticize those in power  
 A small income gap between rich and poor  
 Basic necessities like food, clothes and shelter etc. for everyone 
 
First two answers are representing procedural characteristics, last two are closely connected 
with socio-economic preconditions and overall to the subsistence. While people in majority 
of East Asian states understand the procedural characteristics as slightly more important, 
both PRC and Taiwan have strikingly different results which are on the other hand almost 
identical between each other. From this observation we can assume that incorporation of 
traditional Chinese expectations of economic prosperity is necessary for the definition of 
democracy, and on this count, PRC and Taiwan are very similar.  
 
Figure 5:  Procedural versus socio-economic characteristics essential to democracy. 
Source: Author according to East Asian Barometer, second survey data (valid percent 
values).  
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3. Political participation 
 
Political participation and elections in particular, were inevitably important in Taiwanese 
transition to democracy. Despite the fact that Chinese elections are accompanied by number 
of questions and disputes about their impact on potential Chinese democratization, it is 
necessary to compare at least the basic attitudes to them in both countries. From the numbers 
in table 5 it´s clear, that the voter turnout was slightly higher in Taiwan, probably thanks to 
the general voting right and freedom of the elections. But in the sense of modernization 
theory, the participation should be also influenced by the economic development and 
connected trust in democratic values. Paradoxically, empirical study by Yang Zhong and Jie 
Chen has shown, that people in China, who are more likely to participate in these elections 
tended to have lower levels of internal efficacy and democratic orientation, follow state and 
local public affairs, be relatively satisfied with their lives, be older, and have lower education 
levels. According to this study, in the Jiangsu 2000 elections, there was only 48 % voter 
turnout (Zhong, Chen 2002: 708). Another quite surprising fact is, that in Taiwan there is 
almost three times more people than in China, who believes that their elections are not free 
and fair (table 6).  
 
Table 5: Have you voted in the last election?  
 Taiwan PRC 
Yes 86,70% 74,70% 
No 13,30% 25,30% 
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Table 6: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national 
election? 
 
 Taiwan PRC 
Completely fair and free 18,00% 24,40% 
Free and fair, but with minor 
problems 
35,00% 48,80% 
Free and fair, with major problems  17,80% 15,70% 
Not free or fair  29,10% 10,90% 
 
Because some authors (He 2006) are suggesting, that the voter turnout itself has not enough 
satisfactory explanation strength about the political participation, we can look briefly on 
other factors, denominated in tables 7 and 8. Number of attendees of campaigns or rallies 
testifies about the difference between the two countries in the sense of political freedom as 
well as the difference between Chinese and Taiwanese citizens in the case of following news 
about politics. Living in country with limited plurality, Chinese citizens are more interested 
in news about politics and government.  
 
Table 7: Attend a campaign meeting or rally 
 
 Taiwan PRC 
Yes 86,50% 50,00% 
No 13,50% 50,00% 
 
Table 8: How often do you follow news about politics and government? 
 
 Taiwan PRC 
Practically never  19,60% 0,00% 
Not even once a week  8,00% 19,60% 
Once or twice a week  18,00% 16,40% 
Several times a week  13,70% 16,40% 
Everyday  40,60% 47,50% 
 
As the previous chapter shown, connection between economic development and democracy 
is fairly important. So it is interesting to compare the preferences in the dichotomy between 
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democracy and economic development. As table 9 shows, in both countries economic wealth 
clearly outweighs democracy as a value. For example in PRC, this fact is definitely based 
inter alia also on the official government guiding ideology, founded by Deng Xiaoping, 
which puts financial wealth of each family and citizen on the first place (after the party 
interests of course). Last but not least, the traditional Chinese cultural values are playing a 
big role in this case. 
 
Table 9: If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which 
would you say is more important? 
 
 Taiwan PRC 
Economic development is definitely more 
important  
33,20% 35,30% 
Economic development is somewhat more 
important  
42,00% 27,80% 
Democracy is somewhat more important  12,90% 10,20% 
Democracy is definitely more important  2,70% 5,50% 
They are both equally important  9,00% 20,90% 
 
4. The “real” development 
 
Summing up, there are differences as well as similarities between Taiwan and mainland 
China. Mainly the development of Chinese economy connected with modernization 
indicates, that PRC could feel some changes connected with liberalization and shifts towards 
more democratic (or better to say freer) political regime (some of these, mainly economic, 
changes are already materializing in the forthcoming reforms, introduced in November 
2013). On the other hand, we should have in mind persisting obstacles for potential similar 
development of Taiwanese and Chinese liberalization. 
 
One of the most important preconditions in democratization process is strengthening the rule 
of law. In his study (2007), Weitseng Chen found, that both China and Taiwan exhibit 
„strikingly similar patterns and progression during the development of rule-of-law-without-
democracy model“, which was actual during the Taiwanese transition. On the other hand, the 
same study revealed, that Taiwan was in its democratization strongly influenced by four 
important factors, which, however, do not exist in China. These factors are: early legislation, 
election as an alternative mechanism for law enforcement, international pressure and 
different role of nationalism (Chen 2007: 84 – 86).  
 
Similarly, if we look on the indexes measuring “quality” of political regimes or some key 
freedoms, it is obvious that People´s republic of China was making no progress during few 
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last decades, at least not according to the western measures. The figure 6 shows the ratings 
of Taiwan and PRC during the 1949-2011 period in the PolityIV Project. Very similar results 
are coming from Democracy index or Bertelesmann Transformation Index, which both 
attribute PRC as a country with low and stagnating level of democracy. On the contrary, 
Taiwan is considered as a flawed democracy (rated 37th out of 167 measured countries) 
(EIU 2011: 15). As a brief representative of the most important freedoms, the evaluation of 
freedom of press is depicted in figure 7.  
 
Figure 6: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, Taiwan and PRC, 1949 – 
2011 Source: PolityIV Project 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Freedom of press in PRC and Taiwan 2002 – 2010. Source: Reporters Without 
Borders 2013. 
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Instead of conclusion 
 
In this last chapter I will bring up some final summarizing thoughts, as some unclear issues 
are still in place. Taiwan is definitely playing a big role in the mainland´s political 
reformation and development of its politics, but it is very uncertain, if the Taiwanese path to 
democracy could be used as an example for the PRC. Previous chapters have outlined some 
crucial factors that are similar for both countries. For instance, the Chinese economic 
development is probably on the right way and connection between economic performance 
and perception of democracy is clearly visible in both countries7. Modernization in PRC has 
seemingly positive impacts on education and urbanization and as Andrew Nathan argued, 
“[…] this suggests that, as time goes by, the Chinese regime will find its authoritarian style 
of rule out of synch with the values of a better-educated and more urban public-” (Nathan 
2008). However, due to different conditions, it appears that China will not go exactly the 
same way as Taiwan went, as key indicators remain stable (while support of democratic 
values grows, the quality of "democracy" or freedom of the media remains at the same level 
in the long term). This could be rather negative observation, as the support of democratic 
values possibly equals support for CCP´s regime. It is therefore likely that, if the bigger 
transition occurs, it will be rather striking and not gradual as in the case of Taiwan. 
 
To be more specific, I want to quote two divergent thoughts about the mainland´s future, 
which however both recognize the differences between Taiwanese democratization and 
possible future of the mainland China. Larry Diamond stresses how the structural differences 
between the two states will likely bring about dramatically different denouements for 
authoritarian rule. China’s large size, its different institutions, and its worsening inequalities 
and corruption, he believes, will make it harder for the CCP to engineer the sort of soft 
landing to democracy achieved in Taiwan. (Diamond via Gilley 2008: 14).  
 
On the other hand Gilley concludes that “the transition of PRC could be quite similar to the 
transition of Taiwan. While the Taiwanese transition was categorized as “conversion” (the 
state undertakes a deliberate, planned move to democracy under only moderate pressure 
                                                 
7
 It should be noted, that Taiwan could have also a direct impact on Chinese politics. In 2012, the 
presidential elections were held on Taiwan and the election campaign was one of the most exciting 
events for citizens on the mainland. In the presidential elections four years ago, it was estimated that 
about 200 million mainland Chinese viewers watched the ballot counting via internet or satellite 
television (Yun-han Chu 2012: 43). This fact has to be considered as a proof, that many Chinese 
citizens are impressed and interested in democratic elections and democratic political regime as a 
whole. But it´s not only the matter of television or the internet. Since the traveling between PRC and 
Taiwan is possible, many Chinese tourists, businessman or students are directly confronted with 
reality of Taiwan´s democratic regime. This experience is for many of them a turning point in their 
political thinking. Journalists often bring news about Chinese people, who are led to believe, that 
Taiwan´s democracy is chaotic and its elections are prone to violence, but the personal visit often 
changes everything (Jacobs 2012). 
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from social forces”, the Chinese transition would likely belong to a neighboring type, 
“extrication”, which is a type of state-led democratization that is carried out in “a more 
hurried or crisis-ridden” way because of greater social pressure.” (Gilley via Nathan 2008: 
178).   
 
It should be also once more time noted, that the role of economic development is crucially 
important in this issue, but it is not quite clear, how far will the economic growth be really a 
supportive factor for the Chinese democratization. Paradoxically, it seems that if a 
significant change in the type of Chinese political regime ever happened, the economic 
growth would have to slow down significantly, because Chinese citizens tend to judge the 
quality of regime according to the economic situation of their households (Huang 2011: 17). 
With regards to the economic preconditions it should be also reminded, that according to 
some scholars, the People´s Republic of China is simply not yet at the point of development, 
at which the democratization should occur (Gilley 2008: 20). 
 
The major fact that economy and well-being are very closely connected to the political 
development can be confirmed by few other observations. In simple terms, survival of CCP 
and its legitimacy is closely connected to the economic performance. A new set of (mainly 
economic) reforms8, which was unveiled in November 2013, can be considered as a proof 
that Chinese leaders do know that only moving forward in terms of quality of people´s living 
can assure a continuing future leadership for the Party. Along with that, however, comes 
liberalization of whole society.  
 
If I should answer the question about possibility of finding similar indicators with key 
impact on democratization laid down in the introduction, then I must say both yes and no. 
Although there are some positive factors, like similar connections between economy and 
politics in both societies, PRC is still so much delayed in development, mainly due to the 
large area and huge number of inhabitants. Therefore we can retrospectively admit the 
problematic “factor of size”, but not in the initial sense of in-comparability, however within 
the meaning of excessive slowing of Chinese development.  
 
In the end, only one thing is clear. If the transition to democracy in PRC occurs, it will not be 
the western-style liberal democratization, but democratization in more specific incremental 
form, which will differ in number of parameters from the Western liberal traditions. 
Moreover, this result will be similar with the result of Taiwanese democratization. 
 
                                                 
8
 Reforms, which are by the way referred as “unprecedented” and “the most significant since Deng 
Xiaoping led a series of reforms in the late 1970s and the early 1980s” (Yao – Blanchard 2013).  
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